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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ISRAEL-
SOME COMPARATIVE ASPECTS *
ELIARU HARNON
PRELIMINARY
In July 1965 a new comprehensive law on criminal procedure
was passed by the Kfnesset, the Israeli Parliament It is now appro-
priate to point out some of the main features of criminal procedure in
Israel and some of the more important changes introduced by this
new law.
Until 1965, the rules of criminal procedure in Israel, like the
rules in other branches of the law, were composed of remnants of the
Ottoman law, legislation of the British Mandate and amendments
introduced by the State of Israel. Now for the first time, the field of
criminal procedure has been treated by the legislature in a thorough
and comprehensive manner. With the exception of legislation in
matters requiring immediate attention, the policy of the Israeli
legislature has been to concentrate on one province of the law at a
time. Thus, law reform has been based on a close examination of
comprehensive proposals, after substantial periods of preliminary work.
The new law replaces eighteen former enactments of Ottoman, Man-
datory and Israeli origin and includes almost 230 articles. It covers
almost the whole road of the criminal process from arrest to appeal.
The Judiciary and Criminal Jurisdiction
Although the English common law pattern served as a model
for the administration of justice in Palestine, there was a striking
departure-the absence of a jury which was continued in Israel. The
jury system, whether for preliminary inquiries or for the trial itself, was
never adopted; even in criminal cases, courts are constituted of pro-
fessional judges only. This eliminates some of the problems of de-
fining the respective functions of judge and jury.1
• I am indebted to Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam for his guidance and advice.
" Dr. Jur., Senior Lecturer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; 1965/66 Bicentennial
Fellow in Criminal Law and Administration at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
I The distinction between law and fact is still of practical importance, e.g., in its
bearing on the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the principle being that courts of
appeal generally review only questions of law as distinguished from findings of fact.
That distinction is also pertinent in regard to several rules of pleading and evidence.
(1091)
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The judges of the three main courts-the Supreme Court, the
District Courts and the Magistrates' Courts-are appointed for life.
Tenure terminates only upon death, resignation or retirement (on
pension at an age fixed by statute). Provision is also made for the
removal of a judge from office, but this is feasible only on recommenda-
tion of a special court of discipline appointed by the judiciary itself
for each particular case.' The President of the State nominates the
judges; in practice, he acts upon the recommendation of an Appoint-
ments Committee which consists of nine members-three judges of the
Supreme Court, and two representatives of the Government, the Parlia-
ment and the Bar.'
The ordinary courts are organized in a hierarchy of three levels.
There is one Supreme Court sitting in the capital, four District Courts
and twenty-five Magistrates' Courts.
The jurisdiction of the criminal courts follows the classification
of the penal law which recognizes three classes of offenses: contra-
ventions, misdemeanors and felonies. A contravention is an offense
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one month or, in case
of fine, 200 Israeli pounds ($67); a misdemeanor, the "intermediate"
offense, is punishable by imprisonment of more than one month and
less than three years; a felony is one punishable by death 4 or a term
of imprisonment exceeding three years.
Magistrates' Courts are courts of first instance for contra-
ventions and misdemeanors. The more severe offenses-felonies--
are brought to the District Courts which also have appellate functions
in reviewing the Magistrates' Courts' judgments. The Supreme Court
has only appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.5
As a rule, a trial court consists of a single judge,6 an appellate
court, of three judges. A similar bench of three District Court judges
2 No case of such removal has yet occurred.
3 See the Judges Law, 5713-1953, 7 Laws of the State of Israel 124 (Authorized
Translation from the Hebrew).
4 As to the death penalty, it should be noted that since 1954 the penalty for murder
is life imprisonment, Criminal Law Amendment [Abolition of Death Penalty for
Murder] Law, 5714-1954. Death may be imposed only for certain offenses against
the security of the state if committed in time of emergency or during hostilities, and
for convictions of murder under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law,
5710-1950. 4 Laws of the State of Israel 154 (Authorized Translation from
Hebrew). In the case of Eichrntam, the Jerusalem District Court decided that the
death sentence for violation of this law was not mandatory, but depended on the
discretion of the court. Criminal Case 40/61, Att. Gen. v. Adolf Eichmann, session
no. 121, Publication of the Center of Information 284-85 (in Hebrew, Jerusalem 1962).
The Supreme Court also sits as a High Court of Justice-a court of first instance
in matters not within the province of any other court or tribunal. In this capacity,
it operates mainly as an administrative court, dealing with petitions against official
persons and bodies, such as orders of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus
and prerogative remedies. See the Courts Law, 5717-1957, 11 Laws of the State
of Israel 157 (Authorized Translation from the Hebrew).
6 Inspecial cases, the number of judges sitting on the bench may be increased.
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is required in trials of the more serious crimes: offenses punishable
by death I or by imprisonment for a term of ten or more years.
The Adversary System
Following the English pattern, criminal procedure in Israel is
essentially accusatory and adversary. The state prosecutor and the
defendant have equal standing before the courts The accused benefits
from the presumption of innocence and the right of silence. It is
for the parties and not the court to submit all the relevant evidence
at their disposal 9 and to examine the witnesses through direct exam-
ination, cross-examination and re-direct examination. The role of
the court is predominantly passive, although it will occasionally put
questions to the witnesses in order to clarify what seems obscure or
examine the witnesses after the parties have concluded.'
The judge is not obliged to look down on the arena, to keep
silent and be secretive as the sphinx up to the day of render-
ing judgment On the other hand, we object to that system
wherein some judges walk in the arena to and fro, asking,
inquiring and admonishing, actually conducting the trial by
themselves."
The Israeli judge is supposed to be slightly more active than the
English judge-he is not restricted to "keeping the ring" between the
disputing parties. This tendency emerges from the rules for the intro-
duction of evidence on the initiative of the court.
Even in England the judge may call a witness not called by
either the prosecution or the defense, without the consent of either,
if he finds it necessary in the interest of justice. But after the close
of the case or the defense, the calling of such a witness must be limited
to cases where something has arisen "ex improviso, which no human
ingenuity could foresee." 12 In no case may a witness be called by
the judge after the conclusion of the summing up.13
In the United States, the prevailing rule and practice seems to
be that the judge has no burden or duty of adducing evidence, though
7 See note 4 supra.
8 See High Court 156/56 Shor v. Att. Gen., 11 Piskei Din 285, 297-99. [Piskei Din
("Judgments") -Law reports of the Supreme Court of Israel, published by the Min-
istry of Justice].
9 See Criminal Appeal 38/61 Itzchak, 16 Piskei Din 514, 528-30.
10 The new law §§ 156, 157.
"1 Criminal Appeal 20/49, Zdarurt, 3 Piskei Din 13, 26.
12 King v. Harris [1927] 2 K.B. 587; Regina v. Cleghorn [1967] 1 All E.R. 996.
But see Regina v. Tregear [1967] 1 All E.R. 989.
'1 Regina v. Owen [1952] 2 Q.B. 362 C.C.A.; R. v. Wilson [1957] 41 Crim. App.
R. 226.
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he has the power to do so. It is in the discretion of the trial judge
to call a witness on his own motion, if his failure to make use of this
power has a tendency to suppress some of the relevant facts. It is
generally felt that this discretion ought to be cautiously exercised
only in exceptional cases.'
The courts in the Mandatory period pointed out that because of
the broader language of the law in Palestine, they had more latitude
in making use of their initiative provided that it was carefully and
sparingly used.' In a leading case in 1961, the Supreme Court of
Israel affirmed a conviction based, inter alia, on the initiative taken
by the trial court in calling a witness after the case for the defense
had been concluded."6 In the opinion of the Court, although the
system is adversary and the prosecution carries the burden of proving
guilt beyond any reasonable doubt, it is still the duty of the judge
to ascertain the truth. The Supreme Court, however, directed that
this power should be used only in exceptional cases, when the court is
satisfied that no miscarriage of justice is caused to the defendant and
stated that it is the duty of the court to give the parties an opportunity
to cross-examine the court's witness.' 7 The legislature-as reflected
14 United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945); State v. Loveless,
140 W. Va. 875, 87 S.E.2d 273 (1955); Hill v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633, 14 S.E.
330 (1892) ; 9 WIGmoRE, Evixcz, §§ 2483-84 (3d ed. 1940). See also PAULSEN AND
KADISH, CamIAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1137-42 (1962).
A more active appraisal of the role of a judge, however, has been expressed by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion. In a res ipsa loquitur case he noted
that the failure of a trial judge to call, on his initiative, an available eye-witness is a
legitimate ground of appeal and, therefore, the cause should be remanded for further
proceedings:
While a court room is not a laboratory for the scientific pursuit of truth,
a trial judge is surely not confined to an account, obviously fragmentary, of
the circumstances of a happening . . . when he has at his command the
means of exploring them fully, or at least more fully, before passing legal
judgment. A trial is not a game of blind man's buff; and the trial judge-
particularly in a case where he himself is the trier of the facts upon which
he is to pronounce the law-need not blindfold himself by failing to call an
available vital witness simply because the parties, for reason of trial tactics,
choose to withhold his testimony. Federal judges are not referees at prize
fights but functionaries of justice.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 53-54 (1948). See also HAL & MUELLER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 962 (2d ed. 1965):
The trend has been toward a strengthening of the role of the judiciary, not
for the purposes of making the judge an active or potential partisan repre-
sentative of the people in the case, but for the purpose of preventing abuses
by the litigants and fostering the ascertainment of truth. This purpose has
been all too easily concealed under the "sportive" system.
15Criminal Appeals 68/29 Zenet, 1 Palestine Law Reports 418; 71/31 Salem,
1 Palestine Law Reports 594; 16/38 Chalik, 1938 (1) Appelbom 131; 126/41 Melikian,
8 Palestine Law Reports 478; 112/43 Daksh, 143 Annotated Law Reports 686.
1 Criminal Appeal 153/60 Shefer, 15 Piskei Din 263.
17 The dissenting Justice noted that the majority opinion could well lead to a
relaxation of the adversary system, "for it is usually not carelessness which prompts
judges to overstep their bounds and perform the functions of the prosecutor, but their
distaste for the adversary system itself, on the grounds that it is not conducive to
arriving at the real truth." 15 Piskei Din at 276.
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in the new law 1s and the attendant parliamentary debate 19-seems to
have similar views on this matter.
In the new law, the powers of the court to call evidence on its
initiative have been clarified and even enlarged. One may view it as
a slight departure from the traditional passivity attributed to an
English judge.' °
The Prosecution2 '
The State's control and command of criminal proceedings is char-
acteristic of the criminal law and a sign of its public nature." The
constitutional responsibility of the executive to enforce the criminal
law in Israel has been vested by law in the Attorney General. He
has the primary powers to initiate and to discontinue criminal proceed-
ings (by the nolle prosequi or nol pros) .13
Although one of the members of the Government is the Minister
of Justice, the Attorney General is neither a member of the Govern-
18 Summoning of witnesses
95.. . the court may also summon witnesses of its own motion. . . .
Evidence of court's own motion:
150. When the parties have concluded their evidence, the court may,
either upon the application of a party or of its own motion and if it
deems it necessary, direct that witnesses be called, even where the evidence
of such witness has already been heard by the court, and that any other
evidence be submitted ...
Evidence on court's own motion:
163. Where a'witness has been called of the court's own motion under sec.
150, the court shall give the parties an opportunity to cross-examine him
in such order as it may determine.
10 When sections 95 and 150 of the new law were discussed at the Knesset one
member said, inter alia,
Do not limit the judge. If it seems to him . . . that one link [of the chain]
is missing and he thinks he knows where to find it, what should he do?
Should he acquit the accused? Let the judge conduct an investigation to elicit
the facts to ascertain the truth . . . . [Other] members . . . have argued
that our judges are not dumb, they make the first steps in this [active]
direction. This law comes to encourage that development, and I see in sec.
95 and 150 a further step in this direction; not a revolution, but a natural and
desirable development of the position of the judge ....
Divrei HaKnesset (Records of Knesset Proceedings), session no. 492 of July 5, 1965,
p. 2429, per D. Bar-Rav-Hai, M.K. (in Hebrew).
20 Speaking on the function of the judge in England, Dr. Williams says:
[A]n overspeaking judge is no well tuned cymbal . . . . The classic advice
to a newly appointed judge is that he should take a sip of holy water in his
mouth at the beginning of a case and not swallow it until the evidence on both
sides has been heard.
WIu.IAms, THE PROOF OF GUILT 26 (3d ed. 1963).
21 This part is largely based on High Court 156/56 Shor v. Att. Gen., 11 Piskei
Din 285 and on a special opinion prepared for the Government in 1962 by a committee
composed of two Justices of the Supreme Court and one advocate headed by Mr.
Justice Agranat, now the President of the Supreme Court [hereinafter cited as the
Lawyers Committee]. The task of the lawyers committee was to clarify the powers
of the Attorney General in the enforcement of the criminal law and advise to what
extent-if at all-he is subject to the supervision of the Minister of Justice or the
Government.
22 See, e.g., Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 107
(1955).
23 See the new law §§ 9-10, 202.
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ment nor a member of the Knesset (Parliament).' To be eligible
for his office, he has to have the same qualifications as those required
for becoming a Justice of the Supreme Court. Upon the recom-
mendation of the Minister of Justice, the Government is authorized
to appoint, as well as to dismiss, a person as Attorney General. His
office is within the Ministry of Justice. The Minister may assume
the powers which the law vests in the Attorney General, but this
authority has been used by Ministers of Justice only when the Attorney
General could not function, e.g., when he was outside the country.
It has been clearly pointed out that in discharging his functions
in the enforcement of the criminal law, the Attorney General is not
subject to instructions of the Minister of Justice or the Government.
"The law speaks directly to him and he is personally clothed with
duties, responsibilities and obligations." " Carrying the responsibility
to protect the public interest, the Attorney General ought to exercise
his discretion as prosecutor in a quasi-judicial way and he has to keep
in mind the following general considerations:
Initially, it is obvious that any person who violates the
criminal law should be punished. The prosecutional ma-
chinery should not be used to harass the individual in vain
in unfounded cases. Special circumstances may justify his
not prosecuting even if technically there was a breach of the
law. In other words, despite a provable vidlation of the
law, prosecution should be declined due to a possible adverse
effect on the public interest or because of exceptional con-
ditions related to the offender.2"
Thus it is clear that the European legality principle, under which
the prosecutor is obliged to prosecute if the evidence points to a
prima facie case, does not apply in Israel where the prosecutor acts at
his discretion."
The Attorney General has to report to the Minister of Justice
and to the Government on his actions and ought to consult them
2 4 In this respect, he differs from the Attorney General in England. On the
Attorney General in England, see DEviIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
20-24 (1958); EDWARDS, THE LAW OFICERs OF THE CRowN, chs. 10-12 (1964);
MAcDERmOTT, PROTECTION FROM PowER UNDER ENGLISH LAw 25-41 (1957) ; Robson,
Control of Public Officers, Discretion by Minister, 10 MODERN L. REV. 70 (1947).
25 This is Professor Robson's phraseology adopted by the lawyers committee.
Robson, supra note 24, at 71.
26 See the opinion of the Lawyers Committee 6 (in Hebrew).
27 The difference, however, is in fact less striking than it appears to be. The
discretionary system is based on the assumption that "the criminal process ordinarily
ought to be invoked . . . when it appears that a crime has been committed and there
is a reasonable chance of apprehending and convicting the perpetrator . . . . If the
legislature has decided that certain conduct is to be treated as criminal, the decision
makers at every level of the criminal process are expected to accept that basic decision
as a premise for action." Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1964).
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particularly on matters of political, security or other public significance.
However, his ultimate decisions are his own; he has to maintain a
complete independence and exercise his own judgment and his own
discretion. Even the Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice
with general powers to supervise the executive, will ordinarily not
order the Attorney General to initiate or to discontinue criminal pro-
ceedings; that is within the discretion of the Attorney General. The
Court will intervene only in the exceptional case of mala fides, when
the Attorney General's act is totally inconsistent with the public
interest.
2
Formally, the State is the prosecutor represented by a plaintiff-
the Attorney General or one of his staff, the State Attorney, one of
the District Attorneys or their assistants, or any other person specially
authorized by the Attorney General. All of these officials are appointed
State employees. In Magistrates' Courts, the prosecution may be
conducted by police officers specially qualified, "provided that the
Attorney General may direct that any class of cases or any particular
case or proceedings shall be conducted by some other prosecutor." '
In a limited number of minor offenses, the law enables any
person to initiate directly the criminal process by filing a "private
complaint." In such cases, the prosecution will also be conducted by
the complainant unless the District Attorney intervenes and takes over
the prosecution.80 The nolle prosequi power of the Attorney General,
however, includes the power to discontinue prosecution of a private
complaint.
In all other cases of "non-private" offenses, when the police and
prosecution decide not to investigate or not to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings, the complainant may apply to the Attorney General for
review and the Attorney General's decision is final."
The function of the Attorney General 2 is a very important, com-
plicated and delicate one in the administration of the criminal law,3 and
therefore ought to be above party politics. The structure of the office
of the Attorney General, as described above, enhances that inde-
pendence. Some have doubted whether it is desirable to vest such
2 See High Court 119/59, Reichbach, 13 Piskei Din 1486; High Court 4/64
Wagner v. Att. Gen., 18 Piskei Din 29.
29 The new law § 10(b). See also the new law §§ 9, 10(a), 75(2).
30 See the new law §§ 62-66.
31 See the new law §§ 52-61.
32 See Kaplan, The Prosecational Discrelio*-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
174, 180 (1965).
33"The discretionary power exercised by the prosecuting attorney in initiation,
accusation and discontinuance of prosecution gives him more control over an indi-
vidual's liberty and reputation than any other public official." Note, Prosecutor's
Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1057 (1955).
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enormous powers in an executive official in spite of his independent
position in exercising his discretion. The modes of his appointment
and removal, in particular, worries critics who have suggested some
judicial supervision of his decisions. In this context, the American
law and practice in nol pros is certainly worth considering. In a few
jurisdictions, the prosecutor retains the absolute power to discontinue
criminal proceedings, similar to the powers of the Attorney General
in England and in Israel, but several states have vested this authority
entirely in the discretion of the court. An intermediate system has been
adopted by other states, requiring court approval for the entry of a
nol pros."4 All these modes of judicial control deal only with the
nol pros power. They do not limit the prosecutor's discretion in his
primary decision whether to institute criminal proceedings initially.
A similar intermediate procedure has been suggested in the
parliamentary debate in Israel by one Member of the Knesset and by
the Israeli Criminology Association . 5  However, the Knesset did not
accept the amendment. The only change introduced by the new law
is a requirement that the Attorney General's stay of proceeding be
made to the court by written notice, specifying the reasons.3
Civil Action and Criminal Proceedings
A criminal act, in addition to being a breach of public order, may
inflict injury on a private person. Similar to the law in some con-
tinental countries3 " and in the early days in America,3 the Ottoman
law in Palestine enabled such an injured person to join the criminal
trial as a civil party. In case of conviction, the court had civil powers
to award damages upon proof of civil liability and the extent of
injury. Various disadvantages involved in this joint procedure caused
it to fall into disuse and it is explicitly abolished by the new law.39
Civil injuries may, however, be finally settled incidental to
criminal conviction and sentence without the injured person's becoming
a formal party to the criminal proceedings. After conviction, the
court may order the accused to pay to the injured person an amount
not exceeding 1,500 Israeli Pounds ($500) for every offense, as
3
4 Id. at 1066-67, 1071-72, 1077-81. As to police discretion to invoke the criminal
process, see LAFAVE, ARREST, part II (1965).
35 See Divrei HaKnesset [Records of Knesset Proceedings], session No. 493 of
July 6, 1965, p. 2443 per I. H. Klinghoffer, M.K.
36 The new law § 202.
37 For a recent analysis of such a joint procedure in France, see Larguier, Ttie
Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39 TUL. L. Rxv. 687 (1965).
3 8 See HILKEY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1686,
142 (1910).
39 The new law § 208.
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compensation for the damage or suffering caused to him. For pur-
poses of enforcement, the order is regarded as a civil judgment.40
Most of those injured by criminal acts will institute separate and inde-
pendent civil proceedings thus avoiding the monetary limitation.
Following the English rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn,4' the
courts in Israel held that in civil actions evidence of previous criminal
proceedings, arising out of the same set of facts, is inadmissible; even
a conviction has no probative value. In response to repeated criti-
cism,' a proposal to modify the law for tort actions has been approved
in Israel by a reform committee appointed by the Minister of Justice.
The proposal provides that convictions should be admitted in actions
in tort as prima facie evidence of the facts upon which they are
founded. Subject thereto, new facts may be proved pertaining to
various defenses, including contributory negligence.43
Preliminary Inquiry and Discovery
A significant aspect of pre-trial procedure in Israel is the parallel
development of a gradual abolition of the judicial preliminary inquiry
and the broadening of discovery.
1. The Preliminary Inquiry and the Grand Jury
The preliminary inquiry has undergone three main stages. In
1924, Mandatory legislation followed the English model and required
a preliminary inquiry to be conducted in public by a magistrate in all
felony cases. His task was not inquisitorial, initiating the investigation
and collecting evidence and depositions, but rather accusatory, dis-
40 Criminal Law Amendment [Methods of Punishment] Law, 5714-1954, 5723-
1963, §§ 31-32. Compare some American penal laws that provide as an additional
penalty the imposition of a fine proportioned to the civil injury, the fine to be col-
lected as any criminal fine, but then turned over to the victim. See MAYERS, THE
AmERICAN LEGAL Sysr=it 12, at n.5 (Rev. ed. 1964). Another mode of compensating
the victim of an offense may be found in the practice of conditioning probation
on the restitution to the victim of the loss or damage he suffered. The authority to
impose such a "civil" condition is granted to the criminal courts either expressly by
statute or by a general wide discretion in regard to terms of probation. See Best
& Birzon, Conditiots of Probation-An Awalysis, 51 G~o. L.J. 809, 818, 826-28 (1963).
41 [1943] KB. 587 (CA.) ; [1943] 2 All E.R. 35.
42 See CRoss, EvmENcE, 376-77 (2d ed. 1963); Yoran, The Effect of Crimial
Convictions on Civil Wrong Actions, 20 Hapraklit 322 (1964) [in Hebrew, with an
English summary]; Johnson, Res Jndicata: A Comparative Study, 18 CuuatN LEGAL
PROa_ es 81 (1965).
4 3 In the United States and in most jurisdictions, the rule is similar to the English
one where there is no identity of parties in the criminal and civil actions. In some
states, however, convictions serve as prima facie evidence in the subsequent civil action.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took an extreme view holding that
proof of conviction is conclusive evidence of the facts in issue. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416
Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965), noted in 65 CoLUm. L. REv. 1941 (1965); 39 TFmp.
L.Q. 109 (1965). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287.
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charging a judicial function by examining and reviewing the results
of the prosecution's investigation, the incriminating material assembled
by the police.'
In 1958,5 the preliminary inquiry was abolished for all cases
except the more serious felonies, those punishable by imprisonment for
a term of ten years or more. Even in those cases, the preliminary
inquiry was to be held only if requested by either the accused or the
prosecutor. A District Court judge took the place of the Magistrate.
His task was not to determine whether the accused was guilty, but
only whether the evidence afforded a prima facie justification for
charging the accused. A further purpose of the preliminary inquiry
was to aid defense trial preparation by disclosing to the accused the
nature of the evidence against him."
The new law completely abolishes the preliminary inquiry,47 so
that from now on, even in the most serious crimes, the trial itself comes
immediately after the completion of the investigatory stage, conducted
independently by the prosecution.48
In the United States, the initiation of criminal proceedings in
serious crimes ordinarily must be by indictment.49 The grand jury
process in the United States and the preliminary inquiry in Palestine
and Israel had, in general, a common purpose and function-to guard
against unwarranted prosecution by serving as an effective "filter"
through which unjustified accusations cannot pass." They both have
4 See Trial Upon Information Ordinance, 1924-1925, §§ 16, 18; I BE rrWIcH,
LAws OF PALESTINE 416 (1926).
45 Criminal Procedure Amendment [Investigation of Felonies and Causes of
Death] Law, 5718-1958, 12 Laws of the State of Israel 66 (Authorized Translation
from the Hebrew).
46 See Criminal Appeal 216/56, Yathom, 11 Piskei Din 592, 594; High Court
124/58 Att. Gen. v. The Inquiring Judge, 13 Piskei Din 5.
47 The new law § 226(11).
48 It may be interesting to note that in England the proceedings before examining
justices recently were criticized strongly by Lord Devlin, as an archaic time-wasting
ceremonial. See The London Times, Dec. 10, 1965. Under a new procedure recom-
mended by two Members of Parliament, the defendant would be given, in advance,
copies of statements from the prosecution's witnesses. He could then opt either for
committal proceedings, as at present, or could inform the court that he was willing
to be committed for trial on the basis of the written statement. See id. Feb. 17, 1966.
That proposal seems to resemble the law in Israel in 1958-65. See text accompanying
note 45 supra and notes 65-66 infra.
49 Among the guarantees specifically covered in the Bill of Rights is the right
to be accused by a grand jury. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359 (1956). This guarantee, however, does not bind the states, so that a
state may abolish indictment by grand juries. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
50 See ORFiELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FROM ARREST To APPEAL 144-46 (1962).
It should be noted, however, that the decision of these two supervisory bodies may
still differ when we compare the legitimate considerations. When the evidence indi-
cates a prima facie case, the grand jurors are still competent to hand down a "no bill,"
if they believe that community sentiment opposes prosecution. This "prerogative of
mercy, which all lay participation is intended to add to a professional administration
of criminal justice," was not granted to or expected from the professional judge who
held a preliminary inquiry or his predecessor-the committing magistrate. HALL
& MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 932 (2d ed. 1965).
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powers to coerce people to testify and submit evidence, but otherwise
their modus operandi is significantly different. Unlike the preliminary
inquiry, the grand jury is a secret ex parte proceeding. Only
the prosecutor and sometimes a stenographer are present when
witnesses testify. The defendant is not entitled to notice of a grand
jury investigation. Only the evidence for the prosecution is heard and
that without cross-examination. 51 One whose conduct is being investi-
gated by the grand jury has no right to petition the grand jury,52 to
appear before it, personally or by counsel, or to have witnesses testify
in his favor.53 While the prosecuting attorney has, in fact, unlimited
access to grand jury records and minutes, the defendant in most
states has no right of inspection, but may be allowed to inspect in the
judge's discretion. For many years the general tendency of the courts
has been not to allow the defendant to inspect grand jury documents,
following the opinion of Judge Learned Hand that ". . . no judge
of this court has granted it [a request to inspect the minutes of the
grand jury] and I hope none ever will. . . ." However, in a few
states, like California, 5 every defendant receives a transcript of grand
jury minutes as a matter of course upon indictment.
Elsewhere, it seems that different views have lately emerged.
"Many courts are recognizing the need for pretrial discovery of grand
jury minutes and the necessity for allowing their introduction at the
trial for purposes of impeachment and refreshing recollection," 5' par-
ticularly in cases involving indigent defendants.
2. Discovery in Favor of the Defendant
The reception of English criminal procedure in Palestine carried
the premise that an accused should have some access to the evidence
61 The nature of its [the Grand Jury's] function, unlike an adversary pro-
ceeding, contemplates that it will hear from many sources uninhibited by the
strict rules of evidence applicable in a trial and untested by the traditional
adversary tools such as cross examination. Obviously, public officers are
charged with a high duty to screen out unreliable witnesses, but the critical
and final place to detect perjury is on trial when the witness must face the
accused before the world and expose himself to the rigors of cross examination
and other hazards including contempt.
Coppedge v. United States, 311 F2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
52 In a few states, defense counsel may submit written views for consideration
by the grand jury, although elsewhere this would be regarded as jury tampering
punishable by contempt proceedings.
53 Indeed, it has been argued that this one-sided process weakens the functioning
of the grand jury as an independent check on the prosecuting attorney. E.g., "...
a grand jury may become a pliant prosecutor's tool, rubber-stamping bills of indict-
ment." Excerpts From the Proceedings in State v. Cidombe 29 (Amsterdam Ed.)
(2d Draft mimeo, 1965). But see id. at n.6; HALL & Mur.sm, op. cit. supra note 50,
at 932.
54United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
55 See LouISE.L, MODERN CALr0oRNIA DiscovxRY, § 13.05, at 395 (1963).
56 Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 Mica. L. Rnv. 455, 490 (1965). See also
Note, Disclosiure of Grand Jury Minutes to Challenge Indictments and Impeach Wit-
nesses in Federal Criminal -Cases, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154 (1964).
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collected by the prosecutor. That was not an ancient common law
notion 7 but rather the fruit of reform achieved in England during
the 19th and early 20th centuries."'
However, the extent of access was very much limited and a matter
of judicial discretion. Israeli legislation only recently established a
statutory right to inspect the evidence of the prosecution. 9
In the Mandatory period, a general right of access to the police
file did not exist. The courts, however, recognized that a person
charged with a felony should be entitled to inspect previous written
statements of witnesses whose names appear on the back of the charging
paper and to use these statements at trial in the course of cross-
examining those witnesses. The balance of convenience may decree
that such access should be given before, rather than at the trial.0°
Similarly, the court directed that the accused or his advocate or expert
is entitled, under proper safeguards, to have access to the exhibits upon
which the prosecution's expert based his opinion."' Failing to afford
the defense such access at the trial was considered a sufficient ground
for reversal of convictions.
02
In a leading case in 1951,3 the Supreme Court of Israel refused
to consider itself bound by the limited common law modes of dis-
covery. That judgment broadened the possibilities of access to prose-
7 The Court of the King's Bench denied a request of an accused to inspect the
Attorney General's report of the interrogation of witnesses in India, because "There
is no principle or precedent to warrant it . . . and if we were to grant it, it would
subvert the whole system of criminal law. The practice . . . shows it to be clear
that this defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence on which the prosecution
is founded, till the hour of trial." R. v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249, 1250
(1792) ; "The 'non-possumus' tendency of the common law courts to refuse any measure
of discovery before trial is seen at its extreme phase in criminal cases." 6 WiGMoRE,
EViDENCF, § 1863 (3d ed. 1940). See also id. § 1845.
68 The defendant in England is generally entitled to a preliminary hearing where
he may be present and represented by counsel and cross-examine the prosecution's
witnesses. Records of these proceedings are available to the defendant. Thus, it may
serve as an effective discovery method for the defendant. Although a general right
of pre-trial discovery can hardly be found, a great deal of informal discovery is appar-
ently the customary practice. See LouisL.L, op. cit. supra note 55, at 381-85; WIL-
SHERE, CRIMINAL PROCEDUR 33-40 (4th ed. 1961). For a critical view on this state
of law in England, see Napley, Problems of Effecting the Presentation of the Case
for a Defendant, 66 CoLum. L. Rxv. 94, 103-06 (1966).
69 It should be noted that, in practice, the defendant or his counsel may occasionally
be permitted to have access to the prosecution's material upon a "gentlemen's agree-
ment!' in an informal way, with no need of a court order, particularly when a prose-
cutor regards opposing counsel as worthy of trust and courtesy; but we are concerned
with the right of inspection: to what extent is the defendant entitled to discovery.
One commentator on this subject remarks: "Probably many prosecutors will not, in
any case, yield more than they must." Louis=aa, op. cit. supra note 55, at 374 n.6.
60 See High Court 33/37 Sheinzwit v. Inspector General of Police, 4 Palestine
Law Reports 221, 224; Criminal Appeal 162/28, Sdadeh Alin Rashid, 1 Palestine Law
Reports 348.
61 High Court 33/37, supra note 60, at 225.
62 Criminal Appeal 35/50, Malka, 4 Piskei Din 429, 432-33, 436.
3High Court 147/50 Tzinder v. Head of Police Investigation Dep., 10 Psakim
'Elyon 236. [Psakim 'Elyon ("Supreme [Court] Decisios")-Law reports of the
Supreme Court of Israel, published by the Israel Bar Association.]
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cutorial material in two respects: first, the court directed that prior
to trial, even in the case of charges below a felony, the prospective
court is empowered to grant inspection at its discretion. Second,
whenever the right to inspect does exist, it extends not only to the
depositions of the prosecution's witnesses, but to any relevant material
in the possession of the police, except matters the disclosure of which
is contrary to public policy (e.g., items that concern the security of
the State or names of police informers). However, the Supreme
Court did not find any compelling reason to enable inspection, in
felony charges, at an even earlier stage than the preliminary inquiry.
In the view of the court, the latter process served as an appropriate
vehicle for discovery.' During the preliminary inquiry, the court
added, permission to inspect may be granted by the examining judge.
A law of 1958 for the first time established a statutory right of
discovery."' Any person accused of a felony 66 may inspect the evidence
in the possession of the District Attorney. The right to inspect was
advanced in time, starting when the charge is received.
The new law of 1965 follows the same liberal policy of criminal
discovery and even broadens it.17  The right to inspect is extended to
cover cases of misdemeanors.6 The accused or his counsel has a
right to make copies of the investigatory material.69 As long as the
accused has not waived his right to discovery, the prosecutor may
not produce material in court or call any witness that the accused
has not been given reasonable opportunity to examine.7" The saving
clauses retain the governmental privilege or duty not to disclose con-
fidential material or information pertinent to the security of the state,
but subject to the prohibition not to submit it as evidence.7' The right
to discovery does not apply "to evidence intended to rebut any plea
of the accused which the prosecutor could not have anticipated, or
evidence produced to explain the absence of a witness, or pertaining
to any other formal matter not material to the determination of
the charge." '
64We have seen (text accompanying notes 44-46 supra) that at the preliminary
inquiry there was never any doubt that the defendant has the right to attend and take
an active part.
6 5 Criminal Procedure Amendment [Investigation of Felonies and Causes of
Death] Law, 5718-1958, 12 Laws of the State of Israel § 6.
66 For the classification of offences in Israel see text accompanying note 4 supra.
67 The new law, tit. C.
68 See note 65 supra.
69 The new law § 67.
7 0 The new law § 70.
71 See The new law §§ 71, 74. Compare Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
671 (1957). "The Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price
of letting the defendant go free."
72 The new law § 73. Incidentally, the names of the prosecution's witnesses are
known to the accused since they ought to be included in the statement of charge. See
The new law § 75 (6).
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An observer of the new law might well ask whether the broadened
right of discovery justifies the complete abolition of the preliminary
inquiry. In view of the adversary character of the preliminary inquiry
in Israel, the Supreme Court indicated that cross-examination at the
preliminary inquiry enabled the accused to elicit further facts from
those who gave depositions to the police-facts that may be essential to
the preparation of his defense. Such additional information cannot be
gathered from a "passive" inspection of the prosecution's file.'
Furthermore, with the abolition of the preliminary inquiry, pre-
trial judicial supervision over the administrative action of the prose-
cutor also disappeared, even in the most serious crimes. The impor-
tance of this function of the judge who held the preliminary inquiry
was emphasized by the Supreme Court in 1959.7'
As to rules of discovery in the United States governing federal
criminal trials,75 no report or statement given to an agent of the
United States need be produced until the witness has testified on
direct examination and the trial judge has determined that the report
or the statement is relevant. Then the government must produce it
on motion by the defense; if the government fails to produce it, that
witness's testimony at the trial must be stricken.76
Prior to trial in the United States, there is no established right
of the defendant to inspect all relevant evidence in the possession
of the prosecution. Indeed, until recently, defendants who demanded
it were generally unsuccessful. In rejecting such applications, the
main reasons given were the fear that early discovery would lead to
subornation of perjury, tampering with witnesses and suppression of
evidence. 7 However, commentators on this subject point to the rapid
movement of the law toward early discovery.7
73 See High Court 124/58, Att. Gen. v. The Inquiring .indge, 13 Piskei Din 5,
24-25.
74 See id. at 19-20.
75 Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). An English lawyer has recently sug-
gested "that some provisions based upon the concept inherent in the Jencks Act in
the United States would materially assist the administration of justice in this country
[England]." Napley, Problems of Effecting the Presentation of the Case for a De-
jendant, 66 COLUm. L. Rzv. 94, 104 (1966).
76 That enactment was designed to avoid any broader application of discovery
that might have been given to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See also Note, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 92, 98 (1965).
A defendant also has the right at trial to demand experimental or test examination
results from the prosecution. See HALL & MuIxA, op. cit. supra note 50, at 925.
That right is now advanced to apply also prior to trial in federal cases according to
Rule 16.
77 See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) ; People
ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927). See also 6 WiG-
Moa., EViDENCE, § 1845 (3d ed. 1940).
78 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958). Also see Fletcher,
Pretrial Discovery in State Criinal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1959).
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In the federal courts, the main provision for discovery is Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." It abandons the require-
ment that the defendant show "that the items sought may be material
to the preparation of his defense" and that his request be reasonable,
as to three classes of items: statements made by the defendant, the
results of physical or mental tests and testimony before a grand jury.
These are revealed as of right. For all other items the requirements
of reasonableness and materiality are retained ° Some federal courts
in recent years have applied the Fourteenth Amendment in this field,
holding that nondisclosure of important exculpatory evidence violates
due process of law."' The increasing willingness to grant discovery
seems to derive, inter alia, from a gradual re-evaluation of the role of
the prosecutor. Since the "combat" theory of criminal procedure is less
accepted today, a trial can no longer be considered "a game of wits
and skill." ' It is a recognition that the prosecuting attorney has a
dual role which motivates the demand for a wide extension of discovery.
Discovery is perhaps but one means for reducing the general disparity
between the investigating powers of the state and the defendant.'
79 Because of the restrictive interpretation given to Rule 16 and due to a pre-
ponderance of recent legal literature in favor of increasing the range of permissible
discovery, several amendments to the rule were proposed. The most recent revision
became law at the end of March 1966, upon approval by the Supreme Court. 355
F.2d 184, 186-87 (1966). Discovery extends to all relevant material "within the
possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known,
or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the attorney of the govern-
ment." FED. R. Ciw. P. 16.
80 See also Fmj. R. Cmu. P. 17(c), particularly the last sentence:
The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in
the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the time when
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the
books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by
the parties and their attorneys.
81 See United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (1964) ; Note, The
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALn L.J.
136 (1964); Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence,
60 CoLUM. L. REv. 858 (1960).
82 To require the disclosure to an adversary of the evidence that is to be
produced, would be repugnant to all sportsmanlike instincts. Rather permit
you to preserve the secret of your tactics, to lock up your documents in the
vault, to send your witness to board in some obscure village, and then,
reserving your evidential resources until the final moment, to marshal them
at the trial before your surprised and dismayed antagonist, and thus over-
whelm him.
Such was the spirit of the common law; and such in part it still is ....
It did regard the concealment of one's evidential resources and the preserva-
tion of the opponent's defenseless ignorance as a fair and irreproachable
accompaniment of the game of litigation.
6 WIGmoRE, EvmENcE, § 1845, at 375-76 (3d ed. 1940).
83 See Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Goldstein,
The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149, 1152, 1172-73, 1180-85, 1192-97 (1960). But see the oft-quoted dictum
of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) :
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest out-
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3. Discovery in Favor of the Prosecution
The gradual increase of pre-trial discovery measures in favor of
the defendant raised the analogous problem whether a corresponding
right ought not to be granted to the government. If discovery is
designed to reduce surprises and contribute to more accurate fact-
finding, the very same argument may be put against the defendant
for a reciprocal discovery unless compelling reasons prevent such
an extension.
The new law in Israel does not include any provision on this
matter. In England, it seems that disclosure of evidence is completely
one-sided in favor of the accused. However, to balance the scales,
Dr. Glanville Williams has suggested that the law be amended so that
the accused will be required not only to give advance notice of the
defenses of alibi and insanity and lists of his witnesses, but also to
reveal to the prosecution the documents of the defense including depo-
sitions of the defense witnesses. 4 In the United States, the subject is
under current development, particularly due to a significant decision
of the supreme court of California in 1962.8
Many states have provided various pleading devices to obtain
advance knowledge of the defenses of alibi and insanity and of defense's
proposed witnesses prior to trial. 6 It seems, therefore, that today one
can hardly agree with a sweeping statement that a defendant "need
not disclose the barest outline of his defense." 8'
In the California case referred to above,s the prosecution moved
for the production by defendant of all medical reports and the names
and addresses of all physicians whom defendant intended to bring as
his witnesses or who had treated defendant prior to trial. The trial
court granted the motion and the California Supreme Court affirmed
with one qualification: the defendant is required to reveal what he in-
line of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence;
he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of
anyone of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure and make his defense, fairly
or foully, I have never been able to see. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays and defeats the prosecution of crime.
See also LouisEr-, op. cit. supra note 55, at 370-72.
84 Williams, Advance Notice of the Defence, CRIm. L. REV. 548 (1959).
85Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962).
86 See HAIL & MUELR, op. cit. supra note 50, at 926; LoulsELL, op. cit. supra
note 55, at 416.
87 United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.).
See note 83 supra.
8 8 See note 85 supra.
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tends to introduce in evidence for his defense. Faced with the principle
against self-incrimination, with the rule that a defendant in a criminal
case has a right to stand mute, the court answered that as this evidence
will necessarily be revealed at the trial, learning the identity of it in
advance "merely enables the prosecution to perform its function at the
trial more effectively." "
On July 1, 1966, the Supreme Court adopted the new Rule 16(c)
which requires the court to permit mutuality. The court is now per-
mitted to condition disclosure by the prosecution on a corresponding
disclosure by the defendant."
The Charge and the Plea
The new law establishes a unique form of written charge and
modifies the form of pleas on the merits. Until 1965, the traditional
English form of accusation was used, emphasizing the offense, each
one being embodied in a separate "count." A count comprised two
parts: the "statement of offense," and the "particulars of offense."
Prosecutors were required to follow the models provided in a supple-
ment, e.g., in manslaughter:
Statement of Offense-Manslaughter, contrary to section
212 of Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936.
Particulars of Offense-A.B., on the - day of
at unlawfully killed C.D.
s9 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 922. According to the
dissent, giving the prosecution such access to the evidence of the defendant, violates
the fundamental guarantees against self-incrimination. It undermines the time-honored
position of the defendant in a criminal case.
If the majority opinion were sound, it would mean logically that the prosecu-
tion could serve interrogatories upon defendant demanding to know whether
or not he intends to rely on an "affirmative" defense, what it is, and what
evidence he has to support it. I am not willing to see fundamental consti-
tutional rights emasculated in this fashion.
Id. at 66. For further discussions of this case and its implications see Louism.,
op. cit. supra note 55, at 434-36; Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination:
Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALiF. L. Rxv. 89 (1965); Traynor,
Ground Lost and Found it Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964) (the
author being Chief Justice Traynor who wrote the opinion of the court in the Jones
case).
90 355 F.2d 184, 187 (1966). See also Proposed Amendments, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 34 F.R.D. 411, 422 (1964). On this proposal Professor Amster-
dam remarks
". .. to the extent that the Constitution requires prosecutorial disclosure of
information to the defense in advance of trial it is dubious that the defendant may be
required to waive his privilege against self-incrimination as the condition of access
to the information." Amsterdam (Ed.), supra note 58, at 31 n.13. "If discovery,
by itself, of information in the possession of the defendant would violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, is it any less a violation if conditioned on the defendant's
exercise of the opportunity to discover evidence? May benefits be conditioned on the
abandonment of constitutional rights?" Mr. justice Douglas' Statement, dissenting
from the new Rule 16(c), 355 F.2d 208, 209 (1966).
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The new law does not speak in terms of "counts," "statement of
offense" and "particulars of offense," and model forms are no longer
provided. Instead, the defendant receives a narrative statement of
the facts constituting the offense, so as to give him a complete and
concrete picture of the circumstances of the case.
The document, now called "statement of charge," still contains,
inter alia, the allegation of law violated, yet it is not considered
a central element of the charge, but merely an additional means of
clarification. When the defendant is called upon to plead to the charge,
the question is no longer whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty,"
but rather whether he admits or denies all or any of the facts alleged
in the statement of charge. He may also plead additional facts."'
These innovations are an attempt to simplify the charging paper,
to make it less technical and better understood by the layman. They
are based on the assumption that it is easier and perhaps more logical
to invite the accused's reaction to an allegation of fact than to an
allegation of law, thereby leaving the issue of guilt for the judge
to decide.
A lucid and accurate charge, it has been said, will avoid surprises
at the trial and will enable the accused to prepare his defense more
adequately. 2 Such certainty will also protect the accused from being
twice put in jeopardy.93
In this context, the general provision against meaningless tech-
nicalities seems pertinent. Section 211 of the new law states that ordi-
narily a technical defect in the form of any document shall not affect
91 The new law § 136.
Pleas of accused
[T]he court shall ask the accused to plead to the charge; the accused may
remain silent and if he pleads, may in his plea admit or deny all or any of the
facts alleged in the Statement of Charge and may also, whether or not he has
made any admission as aforesaid, plead additional facts. The response of the
accused may be made by his counsel.
92 See Nuasser, Criminal Appeal 146/51, 6 Piskei Din 308; Kaiser, Criminal
Appeal 88/58, 12 Piskei Din 1628, 1634 (1958).
93 See Kiryati, Criminal Appeal 242/63, 18 Piskei Din, III, 477, 486 (1963).
Section 2 of the new law provides:
Double Jeopardy
No person shall be tried for an act constituting an offence in respect of which
he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
Section 168 says:
Conviction of Several Offences
The court may convict an accused of all or any of the offences of which his
guilt has been disclosed or the facts proved, but shall not pass upon him more
than one sentence for the same act.
Again, it is a factual test, the sameness of act rather than the sameness of offense.
On the forms of indictment or information introduced by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and particularly the short form indictment, see Rule 7 and Holtzoff,
A Criminal Case in the Federal Courts, 1963 FED. R. CRIm. P. 1, 9-10. See also
State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E.2d 917 (1953) ; HALL & MUaLmR, op. cit. supra
note 50, at 934-35.
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the validity of the proceedings unless a miscarriage of justice is likely."
That provision follows the policy directives laid down by the President
of the Supreme Court when the first criminal appeal after independence
reached the Supreme Court in Israel:
Criminal proceedings should not become a chess game where
one wrong move determines the fate of the game. The
function of criminal procedure is to see that justice shall be
done. It is important that the people should realize that
their judges go into the chamber, where crime and punish-
ment are explored, and do not stay in the vestibule dealing
only with the statement of Charge, whether proper or
defective. . . .'
SUMMING-UP
Concluding this comparative study, it may be noted that in spite
of the differences between the American and the Israeli legal systems-
particularly the nonexistence of juries in Israel-they have much in
common in criminal procedure. This similarity undoubtedly derives
from the influence of the English common law on the law of both
countries. Even after the termination of the British Mandate in
Palestine, Israel, of her own free will, has continued to follow the
Anglo-American model in procedure, carefully considering the intro-
duction of modifications. The new law does not reveal any change
in principle in that policy.
We have seen the basic resemblance in the position of the de-
fendant, the presumption of innocence and the respective functions
of court and parties, operating in adversary systems. The analysis
of the powers of the Attorney General pointed out the problem of
control shared by both countries, as to whether or not his decisions
should be subject to any judicial supervision.
The gradual abolition of the preliminary inquiry, the changes
introduced in the forms of the written charge and in the plea and
the proposal that certain criminal judgments shall have probative value
in civil proceedings arising out of the same set of facts-all these
may serve as significant instances of a general trend in Israel to
shorten and simplify legal proceedings.
The law of criminal discovery indicated independent parallel
developments of case law and legislation in both countries to meet the
9 4 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include similar general directions
for effective enforcement of the criminal law without regard to harmless errors that
have no bearing on the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. See Fmn. R.
CaIm. P. 2, 52(a) ; Holtzoff, supra note 93, at 3-4.
95Silvester, Criminal Appeal 1/48, 1 Psakim 'Elyon 513, 525 (1948). See note
63 supra. See also Cohen, Criminal Appeal 321/62, 17 Piskei Din 846, 851 (1962).
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need of information for a fair and adequate defense. The corre-
sponding possibility of directly or indirectly forcing a defendant to
disclose his defense prior to trial is an interesting innovation in the
United States. It may call for further study coupled with a re-
consideration of the traditional position of the defendant in the Anglo-
American and Israeli legal systems.
